

#### Getting the Most Out of Leakage Detection Statistical tools and measurement setups hand in hand COSADE 2017 – APRIL 14, 2017 SESSION 7 : SIDE-CHANNEL TOOLS

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## Motivation

- SCA evaluations are complex and expensive
- So, how can we reduce evaluation time?
  - Optimizing the distinguishers
    - Perhaps the hottest topic in the SCA community
  - Detecting rather than exploiting leakages
    - Cool guys are using *t*-test based tools





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  - Optimizing the distinguishers
    - Perhaps the hottest topic in the SCA community
  - Detecting rather than exploiting leakages
    - Cool guys are using *t*-test based tools
  - Obtaining good measurements
    - Mostly disregarded by academia
    - But, shall we not care about it?





# Our goals

- Highlighting the impact of measurement setups to ease the detection of leakages
  - with tools available in almost any electronics retailer
  - sophisticated bespoke tools are out of scope
- Discussing about the effectiveness of stateof-the-art *t*-test based leakage detection tools
   – fair comparison using the same measurement setup
- Ultimate goal: combine the best of two worlds
   illustrated in a highly noisy case study



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  - typically, fixed vs. random (non-specific)
  - more recently, fixed vs. fixed (improved signal)





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- Estimate sample mean and variance in a univariate fashion
  - traces must be accordingly preprocessed to detect higher-order leakages
- Compute *t*-test statistic for each time sample

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
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• Test fails if at any time point  $|t| \ge 4.5 \rightarrow i.e.$ , leakage detected



























































#### **Case studies**


- First-order threshold implementation of PRESENT
  - 3-share Boolean masking
    - secure against first-order SCAs
    - even in the presence of glitches
  - Negligible algorithmic noise
    - fully serialized architecture
    - small combinatorial circuits
    - · random masks are externally provided
  - Design clocked @3MHz
    - so, no windowing effect






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- Gaussian noise engine
  - FPGA-dedicated design by Güneysu et al.
  - Configuring unused LUTs
    - r cycling rings: noise variance
    - *s* LUTs per ring: noise amplitude
    - our design: *r*=16, *s*=100
  - PRNG implemented as a LFSR









## **Comparing setups**


- Based on the fixed vs. random *t*-test
- Analysis up to third-orders
- Full control over the implementation

   input data can be reproduced for each setup
- 1M traces recorded in a low noise regime

   negligible algorithmic noise of target design
   noise engine is not implemented yet
  - ultra-low-noise design of SAKURA-G board


































## Comparing setups – Wrapping up

- Second-order leakages: not detected
  - due to the register-oriented architecture
  - Setup 1 is the closest to detection
    - noise introduced by the additional hardware?



- Third-order leakages: not detected by Setup 1
  - due to the low peak-to-peak amplitude
  - yet, is  $|t| \ge 4.5$  a good criteria?
    - clear pattern in the plots of Setup 1





## **Comparing distinguishers**


- Same methodology
- Same target
- Just, different distinguisher: fixed vs. fixed
  - goal: evaluate the improvement in convergence speed
- Assuming a powerful adversary
  - full knowledge of the target design and its implementation
  - so, inputs are carefully selected
    - e.g., to maximize HD differences
  - yet, this is not a major requirement for fixed vs. fixed to work





## Comparing distinguishers – Results

- Second-order leakages: detected
  - Setup 1: still unsuccessful
  - significant improvements for the other setups
- Third-order leakages: pinpointed with higher confidence
  - Setup 1: becomes successful
  - Setups 2 and 3: reduction by a factor  $\approx$  4 on the number of traces








## Consolidating results

- Fact: fixed vs. fixed enables leakage detection with reduced data complexity
- Question: is it because of a greater signal or just a reduction in noise?
- Solution: scenario with hard-to-filter noise
  - if so, all gains will be due to an improved signal
  - remember the Gaussian noise engine?
    - noise synchronized with the crypto core
- 100M measurements recorded with Setup 4





#### Consolidating results – Comparison








## Consolidating results - Wrapping up

- Fixed vs. random: no leakage detected
  - Different (fixed) plaintexts tested: yet, same results
- Fixed vs. fixed: second-order leakages detected
  - results are inline with theory
    - low-order moments are more informative in high noise settings
  - Indeed, 60M measurements are enough



- We answered the question:
  - increasing the signal (significantly) reduces the data complexity to detect higher-order leakages





## Final message

- Take care of your measurement setup
  - small tweaks can make a huge difference
- Use the best distinguisher you can
  - for reduced acquisition time and storage requirements
    - critical factor when multi-million traces need to be recorded and then analyzed
  - a plus when the measurement hardware cannot help you
    - e.g., by increasing the signal in the presence of hard-to-filter noise





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#### **THANK YOU!** DO YOU HAVE QUESTIONS?



